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CONTRACT, PROMISE, AND THE 
RIGHT OF REDRESS 
ANDREW S. GOLD? 
ABSTRACT 
 This Essay reviews Nathan Oman’s recent book, The Dignity 
of Commerce. The book is compelling, and it makes an important 
and original contribution to contract theory—a contribution that 
insightfully shows how markets matter. Yet, in the course of devel-
oping a market-centered justification for contract law, The Dignity 
of Commerce also downplays the significance of consent and prom-
issory morality. In both cases, the book’s argument is problematic, 
but this Essay will address questions of promissory morality. Oman 
contends that promise-based accounts struggle with contract law’s 
bilateralism and with its private standing doctrine. Yet, promis-
sory morality is a very good fit for these features of contract law if, 
instead of focusing on a promisor’s moral obligations, we focus on a 
promisee’s enforcement rights. When we look to the morality of en-
forcement, contract law and promissory morality are a close match. 
And, even if promissory morality cannot fully explain contract law, 
it can then be an important component of a successful explanation. 
                                                                                                            
? Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Nate Oman 
and to participants at a conference on The Dignity of Commerce at William & 
Mary Law School for helpful comments. Any errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The Dignity of Commerce1 is a significant step forward for 
contract theory. With elegant arguments—even Shakespearean 
ones—Nathan Oman shows that contract law can be justified in 
a distinctive way.2 Contract law can be justified through its sup-
port for markets.3 Adopting this insight, in turn, opens up a range 
of further insights about contract law doctrines, and it gives us 
genuinely new perspectives on legal policy. For example, it pro-
vides new insights into paternalism in contract law and its poten-
tial merits.4 It likewise provides an appealing basis for enforcing 
boilerplate.5 The book’s thesis is illuminating. 
 The Dignity of Commerce, however, does not merely give us 
a new and fundamental reason to have contract law as an institu-
tion. The book also rejects consent theories, promise theories, and 
similar understandings of contractual obligations.6 From Oman’s 
perspective, it seems consent and promise have relevance just to 
the extent they further valuable market institutions.7 And this 
strikes me as an error. The Dignity of Commerce intends to offer 
us the basis for contract law, but the book’s argument is better 
understood to offer us a basis for contract law.8 It develops an im-
portant and valuable justification for contract law—a justification 
that until now has received far less attention than it merits—but 
still one basis among several.9 
                                                                                                            
1 See NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016). 
2 See id. at 1–8 (discussing Shakespeare’s works and contract law). 
3 See id. at 36–39. 
4 See id. at 164–67. 
5 See generally id. at 133–59. 
6 See id. at 28–29 (rejecting consent theories); id. at 76–79 (rejecting prom-
ise theories of contract). 
7 See id. at 76 (suggesting contract law should be organized around deonto-
logical morality “to the extent that doing so fosters a morality that supports 
market exchange”); id. at 142 (suggesting consent has “two subordinate roles” 
with respect to facilitating commerce and markets). 
8 Or, if we subdivide contract types as some suggest, perhaps it gives us the 
justification for part of contract law. Cf. HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, 
THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 7 (2017) (endorsing a contract law plural-
ism involving multiple contract types). 
9 See generally id.; CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACT OBLIGATION (1981) (arguing for a promissory justification of contract 
law); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 
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 The difficulty stems from the structure of Oman’s argument. 
He questions the adequacy of alternative justifications for con-
tract law, and often with very good reason.10 Yet, even if prominent 
non-market concerns (fairness, efficiency, moral rights, respect 
for promissory obligations) are incapable of providing stand-alone 
contract theories, this conclusion is not sufficient to demonstrate 
that a market justification is the only relevant basis for contract 
doctrine.11 It is one thing to say that consent-based theories fail to 
adequately ground contract law (a valid point), or that promise-based 
theories fail to adequately ground contract law (also a valid point). 
It is quite a different thing to rule out the relevance of consent to 
a contract theory unless consent happens to advance markets. For 
example, even granting the book’s premises, consent may still be a 
side constraint on legitimate contractual enforcement.12 Similarly, 
promissory morality may help to make sense of contract law, even 
if we cannot look to promissory morality alone for a complete ex-
planation of contract doctrine. 
 Although the consent issue is significant in its own right, I 
will focus here on promissory morality. Oman’s work poses a series 
of challenges for promise theories of contract, in light of bilateral-
ism and private standing concerns.13 As we will see, the morality of 
promising can easily meet these challenges. Indeed, the morality 
of promising is a more natural fit for private standing doctrine than 
Oman’s preferred account. To see why requires a shift in empha-
sis, for promissory morality does not apply in the way that promise 
                                                                                                            
(1986) (arguing for a consent-based justification for contract law); Andrew S. 
Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (arguing for 
a transfer-based justification for contract law) [hereinafter Gold, Property Theory]. 
10 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 28–29 (questioning consent theory); id. at 76?79 
(rejecting promise theory). 
11 I assume for purposes of this discussion that Oman is making an inter-
pretive claim about contract law—that is, a claim that we should understand 
contract law in terms of a market justification, and not in other ways. If his 
argument is instead taken to make a normative claim that markets (even vir-
tuous markets) ought to be our only concern at the expense of other moral con-
cerns, the challenges for his approach would be substantially more difficult. 
12 In case this seems like a purely hypothetical viewpoint, it should be noted 
that this is a standard component of transfer theories of contract. Transfers 
are often thought to require consent, yet an individual’s consent is not enough 
on its own to effectuate a transfer. See, e.g., Gold, Property Theory, supra note 
9, at 26 (indicating why consent is not enough); id. at 31 (indicating consent is 
a necessary element). 
13 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 114–26. 
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theorists often think.14 It is not the promisor’s performance obli-
gations that should be the focus of our attention when we try to 
explain and justify contract law. Rather, promises occupy a different 
role. The morality of promises is relevant for determining when a 
contracting party deserves a right of redress.15 
 The following sections will develop the significance of this 
view. Part I of this Paper will summarize Oman’s critique of prom-
ise theories. As noted, this critique takes two forms: a bilateralism 
challenge, and a private standing challenge.16 Part II will situate 
these concerns within a broader account of corrective justice. With 
this backdrop, we can better see why promissory obligations are 
a problematic basis for explaining contract law. Part III will de-
velop a redressive justice alternative. From this right-focused per-
spective, we can see how promissory morality plays an important role 
in contract law, and how promissory morality is a good match for 
both bilateralism and private standing. Part IV will discuss a remain-
ing concern for a redressive justice account: the problem of legiti-
mate enforcement. Only some breaches of promise are suitable for a 
coercive remedy. This Part will note several bases for thinking that 
contractual promises should fall into this category. In the process, 
this Part will also indicate why the consideration doctrine is an inte-
gral part of contract law doctrine. The final Part will then conclude. 
I. THE REMEDIAL DEBATE 
 As noted, The Dignity of Commerce develops a bilateralism 
challenge and a private standing challenge.17 The bilateralism chal-
lenge is a standard feature of contemporary private law theory.18 
As Ernest Weinrib, Jules Coleman, and others have emphasized, 
private law pairs a plaintiff and a defendant together, with inter-
connected rights and duties, wrongs and remedies.19 We might 
imagine deterrent sanctions that take from the defendant and give 
to the public fisc, or to a local charity. Or, as in New Zealand, we 
                                                                                                            
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See FRIED, supra note 9, at 14–17, 24–27. 
16 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 114–26. 
17 See id. 
18 See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 13–23 (2001); ERNEST 
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 63–66 (1995). 
19 For analysis of this bilateral structure, see WEINRIB, supra note 18, at 63–66; 
COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 13–23. 
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might think that in order to address certain claims, plaintiffs 
should be able to draw on a fund.20 Neither of these is the ordinary 
approach. Damages orders take from the defendant and give to 
the plaintiff, and this is built into the law’s conceptual structure.21 
Oman contends that this bilateralism is not only a problem for 
efficiency theories, but also a problem for promissory theories.22 
 The second challenge concerns private standing. Private 
standing has become a prominent topic in recent years with the 
advent of civil recourse theory.23 As civil recourse theorists em-
phasize, only certain parties get to sue.24 It is simply not the case 
that anyone who is foreseeably harmed by a legal wrong can bring 
a claim. Furthermore, in the usual circumstance, not even the gov-
ernment has the privilege to initiate private suits against a de-
fendant for wronging another private party.25 Instead, the party 
that gets to bring suit is characteristically the party who was le-
gally wronged, and only that party. As Oman notes, “nothing hap-
pens unless the promisee chooses to act.”26 On his account, this 
feature is also a hurdle for promissory theories.27 
A.  Bilateralism and the Expectations Remedy 
 Before proceeding, it may be worth noting a definitional ques-
tion. While the book references a “bilateralism” challenge for prom-
issory accounts, its discussion centers on the idea that promissory 
accounts lack remedial fit.28 It does not argue that remedies are 
                                                                                                            
20 For a helpful discussion of the New Zealand approach and its significance, 
see generally David Enoch, Tort Liability and Taking Responsibility, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 250 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014). 
21 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
22 Id. at 114–20. 
23 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of 
Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82?93 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights] (discuss-
ing civil recourse theory). 
24 Id. at 82–85. 
25 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 123. 
26 Id. at 113. 
27 See id. at 117–26. 
28 Oman describes this as a bilateralism argument, which may indicate we 
are using different definitions of bilateralism. See id. at 117 (“Promissory the-
ories have similar difficulties accounting for bilateralism and private stand-
ing.”). As far as I can tell, his argument nonetheless focuses on remedial fit and 
not on the bipolar, structural features usually associated with bilateralism ar-
guments in other settings. 
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going to the wrong party (or parties), or that a promissory account 
is otherwise in tension with contract law’s bilateral structure. I 
am not certain Oman is actually making a bilateralism argument 
as the argument is usually characterized. The potential distinc-
tion need not detain us, however, if the book’s argument succeeds. 
For, if The Dignity of Commerce is right, expectation damages are 
a stumbling block for promissory accounts regardless. 
 To make his case, Oman begins with Charles Fried’s classic 
promissory account of contract law.29 For Fried, “[t]he connection 
between contract and the expectation principle is so palpable that 
there is reason to doubt that its legal recognition is a relatively 
recent invention.”30 In Oman’s view, Fried is too quick in thinking 
that expectation damages match up to what a promisor owes after 
breaching.31 Sometimes an apology will be the right response,32 
and Oman is clearly right in these settings. At some point, we 
have probably all found ourselves forced to break a promise, often 
due to circumstances outside our control. Depending on our relation-
ship to the other party, the seriousness of the promise, and the con-
sequences of the breach, there are cases where an apology may be 
all that is required.33 
 Nor is this the only sticking point. In some cases, expecta-
tion damages might be equivalent to performance—someone who 
fails to pay a debt of $500 and then must pay $500 in expectation 
damages falls into this category.34 Yet, as Oman notes, there are 
many other cases in which a payment of expectation damages is quite 
distant from actual performance.35 Services are often hard to rep-
licate in a satisfactory way, and in these cases the promise principle 
and the expectation principle are not straightforwardly connected.36 
Once again, what the promisor owes as a matter of promissory 
morality could easily diverge from what the law provides for. 
                                                                                                            
29 Id.; see generally FRIED, supra note 9. 
30 FRIED, supra note 9, at 21. 
31 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 117–19. 
32 See id. at 117–18 (describing a convincing hypothetical fact pattern in 
which the author should apologize to his wife for breaking a promise rather 
than provide her with cab fare). 
33 See id. at 117. 
34 See id. at 118. 
35 See id. at 117–19. 
36 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
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 The book also considers an alternative view that might explain 
the link between expectation damages and promises.37 Perhaps, 
“promissory obligations continue to exist in some sense even after 
the initial promise has been broken, and it is this residual promissory 
obligation that creates the duty to pay expectation damages.”38 Now 
this is an account that allows for real differences between initially 
promised performance and subsequently paid damages remedies: 
On this view, expectation damages are simply the continuation 
of the initial promissory obligation. If I promise to deliver goods 
to you at a specified time and fail to perform, my promissory 
obligation has not come to an end. Rather, I remain obligated 
to do the next best thing or something of the like.39 
 The Dignity of Commerce describes this as a “residual obli-
gations theory.”40 It also suggests that this theory fails.41 Impor-
tantly, in some cases the residual obligations that we owe do not 
“consist[ ] of a duty to pay money.”42 Here is Oman’s example: 
Imagine that I am on the way to the airport to pick up my wife 
at 5:00 P.M., but through my own negligence I left late. At 5:15 
P.M., I pull into the arrivals lane at the airport, and when I see 
my wife waiting at the curb, rather than stopping to pick her 
up, I roll down the window and toss out a wad of money as I 
speed by. Few would say that such actions demonstrate a mas-
tery of promissory morality.43 
 This conclusion is compelling, and, as a conference participant 
was quick to add, this promisor behavior seems also to not demon-
strate a mastery of marriage. Throwing some money at a promisee 
is often not the next best thing to keeping one’s original promise. 
B.  Private Standing 
 Promissory theorists must also confront an additional ob-
jection. Oman contends that such theories cannot adequately make 
                                                                                                            
37 See id. at 118–19. 
38 Id. at 118. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 118?19. 
41 See id. at 117. 
42 Id. at 119. 
43 Id. 
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sense of private standing doctrine.44 It is a standard feature of 
contract law that the only parties who may sue for contractual 
breach are those parties whose contract rights were actually vio-
lated (third-party beneficiary doctrine being an apparent excep-
tion to the rule).45 In other words, random bystanders do not get 
to sue when they realize that Person A has violated the contrac-
tual rights of Person B. Nor, for that matter, does the State ordi-
narily enforce contract rights even when it becomes aware of a 
clear violation.46 Only the promisee can sue. 
 It is not hard to see how this structure could pose concerns 
for a promise theorist like Charles Fried. As Fried recognizes: 
The moral force of a promise cannot depend on whether the 
promisee chooses to “enforce” the promise. After all, what does 
it mean to enforce a promise in the moral sphere? I suppose one 
can demand its performance, but if there is a morally binding 
obligation under a promise, the existence of the obligation does 
not depend on a demand by the promisee—nor on his scolding 
the promisor, nor on his feeling resentment.47 
As Oman observes, these “comments seem at least potentially hostile 
to private standing.”48 We might readily conclude that anyone, 
including the State, has an interest in seeing to it that the con-
tractual promise is kept, whether or not the promisee demands it. 
 Under a certain reading of promissory morality, then, private 
standing looks like a troubling feature of contract law.49 Indeed, 
Oman’s argument implicates a wider domain. Private standing is 
prominently featured in civil recourse theory, and standing doc-
trine may support a broader critique of corrective justice theories 
in general.50 Whether our concern is tort law or contract law, 
                                                                                                            
44 See id. 
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302, 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
46 OMAN, supra note 1, at 116. 
47 See FRIED, supra note 9, at 41. 
48 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 120. 
49 See id. at 119–20. 
50 For civil recourse accounts that emphasize this feature, see, e.g., Jason 
Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1765, 
1776?77 (2009); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 
GEO. L.J. 695, 714–16 (2003); Zipursky, Rights, supra note 23. See also Andrew S. 
Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1891 
(2011) [hereinafter Gold, Moral Rights] (noting standing doctrine challenge for cor-
rective justice accounts). It should also be noted that corrective justice theorists 
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courts generally limit standing to the party who was wronged by 
the defendant, and third parties are ordinarily incapable of bring-
ing suit even if they were foreseeably harmed.51 Any private law 
theorist that focuses primarily on the enforcement of moral obli-
gations to correct a wrong must explain how standing doctrine is 
consistent with her approach. If promissory morality does not 
match well with this feature, it is at an explanatory disadvantage. 
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
 The Dignity of Commerce’s suggestion of a residual obliga-
tions theory resonates with the corrective justice tradition.52 In 
particular, it matches the account of corrective justice that John 
Gardner has recently developed.53 For context, this Section will elab-
orate on that account. Unlike some of the other leading corrective 
justice accounts, Gardner’s account does not claim that primary 
rights continue in existence after a breach of obligation.54 Instead, 
a right holder acquires new secondary rights after suffering a wrong, 
and the wrongdoer takes on secondary obligations to do the next best 
thing to complying with her original obligations.55 With this back-
drop, we can better see what challenges a residual obligations the-
ory faces, and better assess how serious those challenges are. 
 On Gardner’s view, all norms of justice are allocative, in 
that they determine who gets how much of something and when.56 
For Gardner, however, corrective justice is a distinctive kind of justice 
                                                                                                            
have responses available to them. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and 
Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 163, 198–203 (2011). 
51 Exactly who should count as a wronged party in these cases is a matter 
of some dispute. For a suggestion that third-party beneficiaries may count as 
wronged, see generally Nicolas Cornell, Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties, 43 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 109 (2015). Others would say that, to be wronged, one’s rights 
must be violated. 
52 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 118–19 (describing a residual obligations theory). 
53 See John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part One: The Place of Correc-
tive Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 46 (2011). 
54 Oman rejects the idea that primary promissory obligations “continue to 
exist” after a breach, and I agree. See OMAN, supra note 1, at 118–19. A key 
benefit to the picture of corrective justice Gardner develops is that it allows for 
this insight. Gardner, supra note 53, at 46. 
55 Gardner, supra note 53, at 46. 
56 For development of the view that justice is allocative, see id. at 6. See also 
H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 21?23 (2d ed. 2008) (offering this type of account). 
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because it involves “allocation back”—that is, the undoing of a 
transaction.57 The presence of corrective justice norms in private 
law may then seem mundane. Legal norms of corrective justice 
are a commonplace part of tort law and contract law, given that 
these legal institutions undo transactions all the time. Such legal 
norms may also be explained in a number of ways.58 The key ques-
tion is, can we locate a moral norm of corrective justice that will 
justify these legal norms of corrective justice? 
 Gardner’s response to this challenge is based on an idea he 
calls the “continuity thesis.”59 This thesis suggests that, all else equal, 
those reasons that justify a primary obligation will also justify a sec-
ondary obligation when the primary obligation has not been met.60 
Reasons for action are thus more persistent than obligations; such 
reasons may continue to exist even after an obligation is breached.61 
 Consider the following example, which Gardner uses to il-
lustrate his theory: 
I promise to take my children to the beach today, but an emer-
gency intervenes and I renege on the deal. Let’s say I was am-
ply justified in doing so. One of my students, let’s say, was in 
some kind of serious and urgent trouble from which only I could 
extricate him, and only by devoting most of the day to it. In spite of 
this ample justification for letting the children down today I am 
now bound, without having to make a further promise, to take them 
to the beach at the next suitable opportunity (if there is one).62 
                                                                                                            
57 Gardner, supra note 53, at 9–10 (“Something has already shifted between 
the two parties. The question of corrective justice is not the question of whether 
and to what extent and in what form and on what ground it should now be 
allocated among them full stop, but the question of whether and to what extent 
and in what form and on what ground it should now be allocated back from one 
party to the other, reversing a transaction that took place between them.”). 
58 The allocation back structure is sufficiently abstract that it can be ex-
plained not only by Kantian and other deontological approaches, but also by 
economic accounts. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Jus-
tice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 187, 201 (1981) (explaining 
corrective justice in efficiency terms). 
59 Gardner, supra note 53, at 33. 
60 See id. A related norm is also described by Joseph Raz. See Joseph Raz, 
Personal Practical Conflicts, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 
172, 189–93 (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler eds., 2004) (analyzing the con-
tinuity of reasons for action). 
61 See Gardner, supra note 53, at 33. 
62 Id. at 28. 
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Once the promised day is over, the original obligation vanishes 
along with it. The day at the beach has already passed—any future 
visit to the beach is at best a close substitute. A substitute perfor-
mance will nevertheless be morally required. 
 While it may no longer be possible to meet the original ob-
ligation (which was either performed or not), “those reasons in 
favour of the action that contribute to its obligatoriness can each 
be conformed to more or less perfectly.”63 It is still possible to con-
form, to some degree, to the reasons for action that supported the 
original obligation to take the children to the beach. As Gardner 
notes, “[e]very reason for action is potentially a reason for multi-
ple actions.”64 It may no longer be possible to take the children to 
the beach today, but it may be quite possible, and obligatory, to 
take the children to the beach on the next suitable occasion.65 
 From this perspective, the original pre-breach obligation is 
simply gone. It ceases to exist. But there are new obligations now, 
and these obligations mandate corrective justice. This moral un-
derstanding of corrective justice norms, moreover, can justify the 
legal norms of corrective justice that we find in private law.66 Be-
cause Gardner indicates that the next best thing obligation applies 
“all else ...  equal,”67 there is also room to take specific context into 
account without automatically assuming these secondary obliga-
tions take hold. 
 Notice, however, that this is a perspective on corrective jus-
tice that emphasizes the obligations of wrongdoers. We might 
wonder how such obligations can match up with the law, given 
that it is frequently the State that brings about a corrective out-
come, and not the wrongdoer herself (or at least not voluntarily).68 
Gardner’s answer is a principle he calls “proposition (c),” according to 
which, corrective justice governs the conduct of “the person from 
whom the transfer back is to be made, or another person acting on 
behalf of that person.”69 If we allow for vicarious agency, the State 
                                                                                                            
63 Id. at 30. 
64 Id. at 31. 
65 Id. at 33. 
66 See id. at 33–34. 
67 Id. at 33. 
68 See id. at 10. 
69 Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). 
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can bring about corrective justice when it makes contracting par-
ties remedy their breaches.70 
 With these pieces in place, we are now positioned to assess 
Oman’s argument about a “residual obligations” account of con-
tract remedies.71 In some respects, this corrective justice theory 
is versatile enough to respond to Oman’s concerns. Because there 
is an “all else equal” proviso, the continuity thesis has the flexi-
bility to deal with hard cases in which potentially conflicting rea-
sons for action come into play.72 This theory can allow for cases 
where apologies are the right answer. Still, in other contexts 
Oman’s point will nonetheless hold true—the next best thing, all 
things considered, will often be different from the law’s expecta-
tions remedy.73 To return to the airport example, throwing some 
money out the window is not going to be adequate as the next best 
thing, and while litigation settings do potentially change the 
moral context, they do not change it in so dramatic a fashion that 
expectation damages will be a consistent fit.74 
III. THE REDRESSIVE JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE 
 In prior work, I have argued that there is another difficulty 
with Gardner’s approach.75 It is not that Gardner has failed to 
capture moral norms of corrective justice—his account is quite 
successful as a moral theory. The difficulty is that, with limited 
exceptions, courts are not typically acting on behalf of wrongdoers 
when they order damages.76 Proposition (c) is not going to help us 
then, because the State is not acting on behalf of wrongdoers at 
all. To the contrary, courts act on behalf of right holders in the 
                                                                                                            
70 See id. at 11. 
71 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 118. 
72 See Gardner, supra note 53, at 33. 
73 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 117. 
74 It might be argued that Oman’s example is a special case, given that it 
involves the husband-wife relationship. Special relationships may alter our ob-
ligations of repair. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 211 (1986) (not-
ing that friends may owe each other less than full compensation after a wrong). 
That point, while accurate, is not enough to undermine Oman’s broader insight 
that money is not always a natural fit when we break our promises. See OMAN 
supra note 1, at 117. 
75 See Andrew S. Gold, A Theory of Redressive Justice, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 
159, 160 (2014) [hereinafter Gold, Redressive Justice]. 
76 See id. at 178. 
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ordinary case where they issue a damages order.77 Moreover, the 
justice that governs right holders when they allocate back (or the 
State when it acts on behalf of such right holders) is not a mirror 
image of corrective justice.78 
 When we recognize that the justice in private law reflects 
a right holder perspective, we can also see more clearly how prom-
issory morality helps to explain contract law. The question of when 
a promisee can justly enforce a remedial right is not a question 
about the performance obligations of a promisor, at least not di-
rectly. Not all promises are enforceable, and not all legitimate cases 
of enforcement are a match for what the promisor owes. Figuring 
out when redress is just—and what remedies it calls for—requires 
us to figure out how a promisee’s moral rights are structured. As 
we will see, these moral rights are a good fit for contract law doc-
trine, and the link between the morality of promises and the jus-
tice of legal outcomes can be a close one. 
A.  Redressive Justice Defined 
 Let’s begin with our category of justice, for that starting 
point can determine which aspects of promises ought to matter. 
Allocation back is central to contract law, but allocation back also 
covers more territory than just cases in which a wrongdoer undoes 
her own wrong, or in which a third party such as the State acts on 
her behalf. There is conceptual space left over if we adopt propo-
sition (c) (the proposition that corrective justice governs duty bear-
ers or those acting on their behalf). After all, sometimes right holders 
undo the wrongs committed against them, and these right holders 
are often acting on their own behalf.79 In addition, when third 
parties intervene, they are frequently attempting to help the right 
holder alone, and are not trying to assist the wrongdoer in complying 
with her duties.80 These cases involve allocation back, but they do 
not involve corrective justice as Gardner defines it. They involve 
redressive justice: the type of justice that governs allocation back by 
a right holder, or by a party acting on the right holder’s behalf.81 
                                                                                                            
77 See id. at 186. 
78 See id. at 187. 
79 See id. at 185. 
80 See id. at 199–200. 
81 See id. 
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 It is not hard to find divergence between corrective justice 
and redressive justice—they are not mirror images.82 In some con-
texts, corrective justice comfortably fits a given fact pattern, while 
redressive justice does not.83 Ordinary promises provide clear il-
lustrations. Suppose, for example, that I promise to have lunch 
with you on Monday and then break my word. You cannot force 
me to have lunch with you on Tuesday—that would not be a legit-
imate exercise of redressive justice, even though I am in the wrong. 
Yet, all else equal, I would owe an obligation to do the next best 
thing (lunch at the next available opportunity), and this obliga-
tion would sound in corrective justice. This is a case where correc-
tive justice fits and redressive justice does not. In other contexts, 
both types of justice are applicable, but appropriate remedies di-
verge.84 In yet other settings, the two types of justice will call for 
the same remedy—but this convergence is not guaranteed.85 
 Authorship also matters for another reason—it has a bearing 
on our moral status.86 Imagine that Allen and Beth work together in 
the same office. Allen has wrongfully taken Beth’s coffee mug, con-
verting it for his own use. Their colleague, Charles, is known for 
his absent-mindedness, and in the midst of talking to Allen he picks 
up the coffee mug and inadvertently places it on Beth’s desk. In a case 
like this, Allen has now missed his opportunity to engage in corrective 
justice—the wrong’s effects have simply been undone. In such a case, 
we should be glad that the mug was returned, but there is still 
cause for regret. Allen’s moral ledger will inevitably look different 
because he has missed the opportunity to fix his own wrong.87 
                                                                                                            
82 Id. at 160. 
83 It is arguable that some unjust enrichment cases involve the reverse pos-
sibility: redressive justice may fit while corrective justice is questionable. For 
example, this view may apply if we adopt Stephen Smith’s perspective on the 
morality of unjust enrichment law. See Stephen A. Smith, Justifying the Law 
of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2177, 2187, 2194–95 (2001) (assessing 
the enriched party’s moral obligations and suggesting that party may have no 
duty to return a mistakenly shipped cow). For a discussion of this potential 
divergence, see Gold, Redressive Justice, supra note 75, at 190. 
84 See Gold, Redressive Justice, supra note 75, at 161. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 Id. at 193. This point may have bearing on our character more generally. 
Cf. TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 29 (1999) (contending that “[i]f 
actions and outcomes were not ascribed to us on the basis of our bodily move-
ments and their mental accompaniments, we could have no continuing history 
or character.”). 
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 A similar point applies with respect to redress. If Beth suc-
cessfully takes the mug back, that is a good outcome; but it is still 
true that Allen is in a different moral position.88 Had he felt re-
morse and returned the mug himself, he would have done more to 
reverse his own wrongdoing, and he would be better for it.89 There 
is always cause for regret when we commit a wrong—as Gardner 
notes, there is an inevitable rational remainder90—but the proper 
extent of that cause for regret will vary depending on whether the 
author of an allocation back is the wrongdoer or someone else.91 
The authorship question gets at a fundamental, substantive dis-
tinction between different types of justice in allocation back.92 
B.  Promises and the Expectation Remedy 
 If we revisit the expectation damages remedy, focusing now 
on the right holder’s side of the equation, we can see why Oman’s 
critique misses the mark.93 Yes, it is true that promisors may 
sometimes owe an apology rather than an ex post performance—but 
even in these cases promisees may be able to demand something 
more.94 Imagine a promisor who breaks his word and says: “I’m sorry, 
can’t you give me a break?” The promisee then responds: “I accept 
your apology, but I still need you to do what you promised.” There is 
nothing incoherent in the promisee’s response, even if an apology was 
the appropriate thing for the promisor to offer, and even if it would 
have been better for the promisee to just accept the apology and move 
on. The promisee is free to be a stickler for her rights, and promissory 
morality often shows an asymmetry between what the promisor (and 
promisee) ought to do and what the promisee gets to demand.95 
                                                                                                            
88 See Gold, Redressive Justice, supra note 75, at 193. 
89 Id. 
90 See Gardner, supra note 53, at 34–37 (indicating that we can never cancel 
out the fact that we have committed a wrong). 
91 See Gold, Redressive Justice, supra note 75, at 187–88. 
92 See id. at 195. 
93 Cf. OMAN, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
94 See id. at 118. 
95 Cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Cor-
rective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 299, 335 (2011) [hereinafter Zipursky, 
Substantive Standing] (“Relatedly, the existence of a right to demand ameliorative 
conduct does not entail the existence of a duty to supply ameliorative conduct absent 
such a demand.”). 
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 Even if moral doubts counsel against a right holder obsti-
nately insisting on her rights—perhaps for reasons of mercy or 
forgiveness—those concerns are not necessarily inconsistent with 
the right holder getting to stand on her rights.96 Morality is often 
thought to allow for rights to do wrong, and a discretion to act 
wrongfully plausibly extends to promissory morality.97 If we con-
sider Oman’s apology example, this is a setting where a contrac-
tual right holder, as a matter of promissory morality, may get to 
insist on a “next best thing” remedy, even though a more virtuous 
choice would be for him to accept the apology. When we shift from 
the perspective of the promissory wrongdoer to the perspective of 
the promissory right holder, the moral answer must take into ac-
count not only how the promisee ought to act, but how he should 
get to act. If the law takes into account moral rights to do moral 
wrong, a right holder may insist on far more than an apology even 
in settings where the apology ought to be accepted as sufficient. 
 It is likewise true that expectation damages may be a less than 
fully adequate substitute for performance in cases involving unique 
services.98 But contracts that implicate unique services are also the 
kind of contracts that raise moral concerns about when a right holder 
should be able to legitimately coerce, and in what fashion.99 It is not 
always morally acceptable for one private party to coerce another, 
and promissory morality has different things to say with regard 
to the conduct of right holders and duty bearers. Consider a case 
                                                                                                            
96 Whether the law should let people be sticklers for their rights or even 
assist them in doing so is a complex problem. For discussion of that question, 
see Dennis Klimchuk, Equity and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 247 (Lisa Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014); Andrew S. Gold, 
Equity and the Right to Do Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 
OF EQUITY (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Henry Smith eds.) (forthcoming). 
97 For helpful discussion of moral rights to do moral wrong, see generally 
JEREMY WALDRON, A Right to Do Wrong, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 
1981–1991, 63 (1993); David Enoch, A Right to Violate One’s Duty, 21 LAW & PHIL. 
355, 378–80 (2002); Ori J. Herstein, Defending the Right to Do Wrong, 31 LAW & 
PHIL. 343 (2011). Note that if courts are assisting in a right holder’s morally 
wrongful conduct, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that courts are 
doing justice. See Andrew S. Gold, Justice, Redress, and the Right to Do Wrong, in 
EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFIT 41, 60–61 (Simone 
Degeling & Jason NE Varuhas eds., 2017) [hereinafter Gold, Right to Do Wrong]. 
98 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 119. 
99 Cf. Andrew S. Gold, Consideration and the Morality of Promising, in EX-
PLORING CONTRACT LAW 115 (Jason W. Neyers, Richard Bronaugh, and Stephen 
G.A. Pitel eds., 2009) [hereinafter Gold, Morality of Promising]. 
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involving unique services, such as a famous artist who has promised 
to paint a portrait. If he breaks his word, something like expecta-
tion damages may be all that the promisee can legitimately coerce.100 
It would not be okay for the promisee to simply make the artist paint. 
When we break a promise, we often ought to perform after the fact, 
but it does not follow that a promisee should always be able to force 
us to perform.101 Depending on context, expectation damages may be 
the most that a promisee’s moral enforcement rights will permit. 
C. The Standing Issue 
 Now, it might be argued that there is still a difficulty here, be-
cause we still need to address the special standing that plaintiffs 
possess. Ordinarily, only contractual promisees can sue.102 Yet 
Oman’s view that promissory morality does not match up with this 
standing doctrine is puzzling. Mainstream theories of promissory 
morality suggest that promisees do have a special standing to make 
demands on promisors.103 Private rights of action parallel this feature 
of promissory morality; indeed, private rights of action are generally 
unavailable to individuals who lack this moral standing.104 This 
suggests that promissory morality could be central to contract law. 
 For example, Margaret Gilbert’s work on promissory morality 
suggests that promisees have a special standing not shared with 
the general population.105 She imagines a case in which she has made 
a promise to the reader. On Gilbert’s understanding, “If I were to al-
low that I owe you performance, then I would recognize that you 
have the standing to upbraid me for nonperformance, or to insist on 
performance. Before the fact you could pressure me, saying in effect: 
‘Give me that! It’s mine!’”106 Third parties may also have something 
to say, but she notes that their standing is importantly different: 
                                                                                                            
100 Nothing in the present Essay rules out the possibility of indeterminacy 
in the “next best thing” that a promisee can morally insist upon. The precise 
form that expectation damages take—as opposed to an equivalent collection of 
valuable assets—can be explained by institutional concerns such as accessibil-
ity and ease in measurement. 
101 See id. at 125?26. 
102 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 113. 
103 See Gold, Morality of Promising, supra note 99, at 124. 
104 Cf. id. at 116. 
105 See Margaret Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of 
Promisees’ Rights, 101 J. PHIL. 83, 83 (2004). 
106 Id. at 101. 
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It is true that a bystander could say, “Give her that! It’s hers!” 
The case in which I command you to give me what is mine is 
special, however. The bystander’s standing to command you to 
give it to me can be questioned. My standing surely cannot be 
questioned. In the bystander’s case, the riposte “It’s none of 
your business!” makes sense. In my case, it does not.107 
This phenomenon should be recognizable to many of us, including 
the reaction that, for bystanders, “it’s none of your business.”108 
The social practice of promising incorporates the idea that a prom-
isee has a special standing, and promissory morality plausibly in-
cludes this same feature. 
 We can reach a similar conclusion if we build on Stephen 
Darwall’s account of the second-person standpoint in morality.109 
Darwall’s famous example involves a foot-stomping episode.110 When 
someone non-consensually stomps on your foot, this wrong has 
significance for anyone in the moral community; but it also impli-
cates a specific relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim.111 
As Darwall explains: 
In addition to there being weighty reasons against others step-
ping on your feet, indeed, in addition to members of the moral 
community having the standing to demand that people not step 
on your feet, if you have a right, then you have standing to make 
a special demand against people who might step on your feet—you 
have the authority to resist, claim compensation, and so on.112 
 Since promises are ordinarily understood to create moral 
rights in a promisee, it is not surprising that promissory morality 
should recognize this special standing in appropriate cases. Ad-
mittedly, one might see morality in general, or promissory morality 
in particular, from a different perspective. But if we are seeking 
to interpret contract law in light of conventional understandings 
of promissory morality, these accounts are serious contenders. 
                                                                                                            
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 5 (2006). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 8–9. 
112 See id. at 18. A related point is developed in Stephen Darwall, Law and 
the Second-Person Standpoint, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 891, 891–92 (2007). This per-
spective also appears more broadly in Joel Feinberg’s account of a claim right. 
See Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND 
THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 143, 150 (1980). 
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 If anything, promissory concepts are better situated to ex-
plain private standing doctrines than a market-based account, and 
especially so if private standing is linked to a form of attack on the 
defendant (as Oman argues that it is).113 The Dignity of Commerce 
explains private standing as a substitute for violent patterns of 
retaliation.114 This is a possible explanation, but unlikely.115 While 
one can bring a market justification together with a world in which 
contracting parties are tempted by bloody revenge, the two perspec-
tives are an awkward fit. The average person confronted with a con-
tract breach in today’s world is likely to want payment, goods, or 
services—not vengeance.116 To the extent we focus on the way courts 
tend to think, it also seems doubtful that a substitute-for-bloody-
revenge picture is what modern courts have in mind.117 A retalia-
tion-based theory could be right, even so. That said, an account that 
explains private standing from the perspective of promissory mo-
rality is more straightforward, both as a matter of concepts and 
as a matter of judicial psychology. 
IV. THE CHALLENGE FOR REDRESSIVE JUSTICE 
 There is still a lingering concern, but it is different from the 
concerns developed in The Dignity of Commerce. The reader may 
have noticed that much of the above discussion emphasizes a spe-
cial standing to make demands. This kind of standing is certainly 
                                                                                                            
113 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 128. 
114 See id. at 127. 
115 Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil Recourse, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
65, 71 (2011) [hereinafter Gold, Taxonomy]. 
116 See id. (“Ordinary contract breaches are poor cases for vengeance, espe-
cially where the breach may be inadvertent or hard to avoid. Indeed, even the notion 
of ‘getting satisfaction’ is a questionable fit for much of contract law.”). This is not 
to deny that some contractual breaches sting. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David 
Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (2010) (studying 
the psychological impact of contract breaches). Nor is it to deny that lawsuits 
are adversarial. Oman recognizes that the retaliation picture “may seem odd,” 
but emphasizes that “[p]eople experience litigation as an aggressive action.” 
See OMAN, supra note 1, at 126. This insight is accurate, but it is not enough to 
sustain the argument. Rights enforcement is aggressive but frequently not retal-
iatory, and in contract cases the aggression involved is a poor fit for retaliation. 
117 Gold, Taxonomy, supra note 115, at 71. 
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an important moral feature, and recent work has emphasized the 
importance of a standing to make demands, or to complain about 
a wrong, for both tort law and contract law.118 For some, private 
rights of action may even be understood in light of this feature.119 
Yet, on its own, a wronged party’s standing to make demands is 
not a perfect fit for a standing to pursue coercive legal remedies. 
 The moral standing to make demands is a starting point, but 
it cannot be our endpoint because that type of standing is overin-
clusive. For example, an ordinary promise to have lunch creates 
moral obligations, and it does give the promisee a special standing 
to make demands if the promise is broken; but you don’t get to force 
someone to have lunch with you if they refuse.120 The plaintiff must 
also hold a moral enforcement right, and this right can’t be dem-
onstrated merely by showing that something is owed to her or that 
she gets to demand compliance after the fact.121 A redressive justice 
approach thus presents us with the following challenge: we must 
locate a basis for thinking that the plaintiff holds more than a 
moral right to a given outcome (e.g., a right to a promised perfor-
mance) or even a right to demand that outcome. 
                                                                                                            
118 See Zipursky, Substantive Standing, supra note 95, at 332 (“The more 
general point is that the fact of having been wronged by another generates not 
only a basis for complaining of having been wronged by the other, but also a 
basis for a demand for ameliorative conduct by the wrongdoer.”); Nicolas Cor-
nell, A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law, 
164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2016) (emphasizing a contract right holder’s 
standing to complain about a wrong). This work also invites a clarification. Cornell 
appears to believe I support the idea that coercion is automatically available 
post-wrong. See id. at 1166, n.146 (distinguishing my account because “it is not 
clear ... that, absent a state institution like contract law, someone would have 
a right to coercively extract expectation damages; having been wronged does 
not automatically give a person the right to coerce”). But my central point is 
that having been wronged does not automatically give a person the right to coerce; 
the main question on my account is the question of when, as a contingent matter, 
this right to coerce will exist. 
119 Cf. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, supra note 95, at 311. 
120 See Gold, Morality of Promising, supra note 99, at 127 (“A moral right to 
performance of a promise could mean the possessor of the right has standing 
to demand the other party meet the obligation, and to rebuke a failure to perform, 
or it could mean the possessor of the right has standing to demand performance 
and also, if performance is not forthcoming, to physically coerce the other party 
to meet the obligation.”). 
121 See id. at 124. 
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 One way to determine that promissory rights are apt for 
coercive enforcement is to find that the rights at issue are owner-
ship rights.122 If we have a proprietary (or at least property-like) 
interest in contractual performance, this suggests the kind of re-
lationship that can support legitimate exercises of force.123 People 
can forcefully protect themselves in self-defense cases, and they 
can also forcefully protect their property.124 In fact, the doctrine 
of recaption of chattels extends this enforcement right to the ex 
post realm.125 If someone steals your wallet from you, you can 
chase after them and rightfully grab it back. For many of us, this 
is morally legitimate conduct by the right holder.126 It is, likewise, 
ordinarily considered a fitting exercise of State power when the 
State acts on our behalf to protect our property rights. If contract 
rights are proprietary, that is a prima facie basis for thinking en-
forcement is appropriate.127 
                                                                                                            
122 See, e.g., id. at 126. Another possibility is that the legal system’s choice 
to provide for enforcement will help justify enforcement in appropriate cases. 
For example, even if contracts under seal (without consideration) would not be 
suitable for coercive remedies in a state of nature, they might be legitimately 
enforceable when a legal system has provided for this result, and the promisor 
has made a promise in light of that legal backdrop. That said, the moral anal-
ysis in such cases involves more than just the State’s imprimatur. Questions 
of consent, for example, would still be relevant. 
123 See, e.g., Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 46 (discussing this pos-
sibility). 
124 See, e.g., Zoë Sinel, De-Ciphering Self-Help, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 31, 50–51 
(2017) (discussing these types of self-help). 
125 On the theoretical questions raised by recaption doctrine, see Andrew S. 
Gold, Private Rights and Private Wrongs, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1071, 1074–76 
(2017) [hereinafter Gold, Private Rights]; Sinel, supra note 124, at 46–51. 
126 This may depend, however, on whether one adopts a Kantian perspective 
on private law. Compare ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 146 (2009) (describing the Kantian view on unilateral 
choices regarding the entitlements of others), with Victor Tadros, Independence 
Without Interests?, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 202–06 (2011) (critiquing this 
perspective). That said, I have doubts whether the Kantian account adequately 
fits private law doctrine. See generally Gold, Private Rights, supra note 125. 
127 This challenge has also been analyzed in terms of the harm principle. 
See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS 
IN JURISPRUDENCE (FOURTH SERIES) 107, 120–29 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) 
(“On the right-creation view of contract, a contract creates what is in effect a 
property right in the promisee, albeit a property right in the performance of an 
act.”); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 72 (2004) (suggesting the import of 
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 The question then is whether contract rights have the correct 
features to count as proprietary or property-like. We need something 
more than just a promisee’s standing to demand performance or a 
remedy. Why think this added proprietary feature exists in the con-
tractual setting? One answer draws on promissory morality itself.128 
Contracts generally involve conditional promises; these are promises 
that bind us to perform if their terms have been met but not be-
fore.129 Suppose that these conditions have been met by a promisee’s 
bargained-for conduct. Significantly, this places the promisee in a 
different relationship to the promise from the one she occupied 
before. She has acted on the promise, working to make its terms 
apply, and this changed relationship can implicate principles of 
just property acquisition.130 
 Principles of just property acquisition will admittedly take 
different forms for different theorists.131 They are sufficiently con-
tested that it is unlikely consensus will be reached, and I will not try 
to demonstrate which approach is best. Each approach is controver-
sial, in some cases for good reason. What I hope to show for present 
purposes is simply that the structure of contractual relationships 
matches reasonably well with several of the leading approaches 
to property acquisition.132 Some candidates are developed below 
to help illustrate the core idea. 
 We might think that a Lockean approach based on a mixing 
of labor with the desired thing helps to explain why we should own 
a contractual performance.133 This is a labor-desert theory, based on 
the interactions between the would-be owner and the acquired prop-
erty. In Locke’s famous language: “Whatsoever ... he removes out 
of the state that nature hath provided ... he hath mixed his labor 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes 
                                                                                                            
owning rights to performance). Note also that Smith suggests a property-based 
account of contract rights without adopting a transfer theory; both promise 
theories and transfer theories may thus look to property theory for guidance. 
128 See, e.g., Gold, Morality of Promising, supra note 99, at 126. 
129 See RAZ, supra note 74, at 174–75 (noting the link between conditional 
promises and agreements). 
130 See Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 5. 
131 See id. at 34–42. 
132 For further discussion, see id. See also infra text accompanying notes 133?47. 
133 See, e.g., Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 34–35. 
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it his property.”134 We may conclude that the promisee, having la-
bored to attain the promised performance by acting to meet the 
promise’s terms, has mixed her labor with the acquired property—
and therefore that she rightly owns the promised performance.135 
 One could also rework a Lockean theory so that the “mixing 
labor” argument concerns the acquirer’s identification of his person-
ality with the relevant thing.136 As Karl Olivecrona notes, “We can 
have a feeling of things being so intimately connected with ourselves 
that they are part of our very selves. Being deprived of such objects 
represents something more than an economic loss. It is experienced 
as an attack on the personality itself.”137 From this perspective, the 
contractual promisee may be understood to identify with the prom-
ised performance in light of her efforts to meet a conditional prom-
ise’s terms.138 
 In some contexts, we might adopt a capture or first-possession 
theory of property acquisition.139 Consider the case of a unilateral 
contract, where the first person to meet the terms of the promi-
sor’s offer will obtain a right to a payment of $1,000. In such a 
case, if Jane is able to meet the terms of the promise before any-
one else, she has brought it under her control. In a sense, we can 
say that she has captured the promise, occupying a relation to it 
that is roughly analogous to the relation that an individual has 
                                                                                                            
134 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CON-
CERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1681), 
reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 261, 274 (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
135 It should be noted that some of the classic concerns with a “mixing labor” 
theory are less compelling in contractual contexts. For example, the contractual 
acquisition is not the result of a unilateral act as between the contracting par-
ties. In addition, while the value of the promisee’s labor may be far less than 
the value of the thing acquired, in contract cases the promisor is the one who 
decided to allow for such an acquisition. For discussion, see Gold, Property Theory, 
supra note 9, at 35–37. 
136 See, e.g., id. at 37. 
137 See Karl Olivecrona, Locke’s Theory of Appropriation, 24 PHIL. Q. 220, 
224 (1974). Jeremy Waldron expresses doubts about this approach. See JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 195 (1988) (noting that people 
sometimes identify with property owned by others). For a response in the con-
tractual setting, see Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 37 n.178. 
138 See Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 38. 
139 For discussion of first-possession theories of property acquisition, see 
Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25 
(1979). See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985). 
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when they capture a wild animal.140 Unlike capturing an animal, 
however, the promise itself sets its own terms for what will suf-
fice. The result, again, is a claim of ownership. 
 Alternatively, we might be drawn to a more Hegelian point of 
view—i.e., we might agree with an embodiment theory of acquisi-
tion.141 In that case, we are looking for a certain relation between the 
acquirer’s will and the acquired object.142 From this perspective, we 
acquire something if that thing is now intelligible in terms of the ac-
quirer’s will; property is acquired when the acquirer’s will is embod-
ied in the thing acquired.143 As Jeremy Waldron helpfully elaborates: 
If the object is inanimate (say, a piece of marble formed into a 
statue) then the aspect of the object which may be understood 
only by reference to my will is one of its physical properties—
its shape, for example. If the object is organic, then maybe it is 
not merely some property which is understood in this way but 
also some ongoing process in the object ....144 
 This too is a kind of relationship that may come into exis-
tence where a promisee has met the terms of a contractual prom-
ise.145 The promisee has worked her will on the promise by meeting 
its terms, and its bindingness is intelligible in light of her conduct.146 
 Again, these are just candidate theories, and the reader may 
find more than one of them appealing—or perhaps be drawn to a 
different view altogether. The important point is that principles 
of just property acquisition that apply in other settings have ana-
logues that operate in the setting of contractual promises.147 In those 
contexts where a promisee has provided the contractually set form 
of consideration, the promise at issue has been made binding. Its 
                                                                                                            
140 See Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 39 nn.183–84. 
141 See G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 44, at 75–76 
(Allan W. Wood ed., 1991). 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 364. 
145 See Gold, Property Theory, supra note 9, at 41. 
146 See id. 
147 The notion that one can own a contractual performance also has a long pedi-
gree. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 20, at 93 (Mary 
J. Gregor trans., 1991) (“By a contract I acquire something external. But what is it 
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rather his deed, by which that thing is brought under my control so that I make 
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terms have been met. This change in status does something more 
than simply activate a promise because it also has bearing on the set 
of rights held by the promisee.148 It means that the promisee has 
an interest in performance that is different from the interest held 
by an ordinary, non-contractual promisee; it is legitimately en-
forceable at her option.149 Consideration doctrine is thus a reflec-
tion of what it takes to justify enforceable promissory rights.150 
 In supporting the consideration doctrine, this approach is 
also well within the mainstream. Granted, Oman contends that 
supporters of the consideration doctrine are few and far be-
tween.151 Yet the doctrine actually has a number of defenders,152 
and the recent trend in contract theory favors the consideration doc-
trine, with accounts by Peter Benson,153 Curtis Bridgeman,154 
Robin Kar,155 Daniel Markovits,156 and myself157 all incorporating it. 
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These accounts draw on a number of different theoretical perspec-
tives, with inspirations ranging from Hegel, to Rawls, to Locke, to 
Bratman.158 Given the wide set of theories capable of justifying 
the consideration doctrine and the variety of resources they are able 
to build upon, we might even think that a good interpretive account 
of contract law needs to explain why the consideration doctrine 
makes sense.159 
 It is not clear how the account in The Dignity of Commerce 
would address the full range of plausible justifications for the con-
sideration doctrine, as the book’s focus is elsewhere. In light of 
their unique features, each pro-consideration theory likely calls 
for its own response. For our purposes, the key insight is that the 
consideration doctrine is not only defensible, but defensible from 
a perspective that draws on promissory morality.160 Historically, 
scholars who support a promise-based approach to contract law 
have been troubled by the consideration doctrine.161 Charles 
Fried’s work is a good example, as is Seana Shiffrin’s recent writ-
ing.162 If, however, promissory morality is approached from the 
perspective of a promisee’s standing to enforce, the moral land-
scape looks very different. Doctrines that are hard to explain when 
we just look at a promisor’s obligation to perform (or to remedy a 
non-performance) are more readily understood if we look at a prom-
isee’s enforcement rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Sometimes private law theories crowd out their rivals. If 
one begins with the idea that everything in private law has to be 
unified under a single principle, locating the most plausible prin-
ciple may be a first step toward ruling out alternative theories 
based on other principles. Such unifying approaches need defend-
ing, however, and we need a basis for thinking that a proffered 
explanation has vanquished its rivals. The idea that contract law 
is justified by the value of virtuous markets does not give us any 
obvious reason for ruling out additional justifications. It may even 
seem to invite them, since contract law might advance virtuous 
behavior by other means as well. The Dignity of Commerce appears 
to leave room for other theories to succeed alongside it. 
 Note also that it is not enough to show that other theories 
fall short as complete justifications for contract law. Suppose that 
no other theory is up to the task. Even if there are no viable alter-
native theories that can justify contract law as a whole, it would not 
follow that non-market values become irrelevant to a proper un-
derstanding of contracts, or else relevant only when those values 
support markets. The absence of consent might operate as a side 
constraint, or at least as a concern to be balanced against reasons 
for supporting markets. Likewise, promises may help constitute 
contracts, even if promissory morality cannot justify contract law 
on its own. In order to fully understand contract law, we might 
need to figure out when promises are valid, what their scope is, 
and how they affect moral rights. 
 Consider the problem of consent. To give an extreme exam-
ple, imagine a world in which virtuous markets could be advanced 
if a certain percentage of the public were beaten up to “convince” 
them to enter the right kind of contracts. This coercion is unac-
ceptable, and the resulting agreements should not be enforceable. 
A principle that physically assaulting people is beyond the pale will 
hardly justify contract law as such—it does not have the right fea-
tures to do that—but we can still think that such principles have 
bearing on whether a contract should count as valid. And we might 
think that this is, in part, because consent matters. Notice, moreover, 
that the merits of this view can be separated from our interest in 
market-based benefits. Many of us will conclude that such coerced 
contracts should lack validity irrespective of the effect on markets. 
 Promissory morality may be relevant in a different way. It 
is difficult to provide a convincing account of contract law that 
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just builds on promissory obligations to perform.163 Yet it is quite 
possible to come up with theories of contract law that depend in part 
on features of promissory morality. One might think, for example, 
that contracts are best understood as a kind of transfer, and that 
valid promises are partly constitutive of contractual transfers.164 On 
this view, a promise on its own simply isn’t enough, but a promise 
in combination with other things may account for many of the 
law’s features: the enforceability of contracts, the bilateralism of 
contract law, the expectation damages remedy, the special stand-
ing of contractual promisees, and even the consideration doctrine.165 
 These points can be obscured by an understanding of cor-
rective justice that centers on the obligations of wrongdoers to re-
verse their wrongs. Applied to contracts, a corrective justice picture 
tends to emphasize a promisor’s duty to correct, and as Oman rightly 
explains, such promissory duties often look quite different from 
the expectation damages remedy.166 In other words, it is not just 
that promissory morality is insufficient to fully justify contract 
law, but also that a promisor’s performance obligations are a mis-
match for the way that contract law functions. 
 Shifting to rights of redress can help solve this puzzle, and 
in a way that preserves many of the core insights in The Dignity 
of Commerce. A good theory of contracts may need to build on an 
account of justice between individuals.167 Judges author opinions 
that indicate that private law is intended to provide justice for the 
parties in particular, with respect to their dispute. While correc-
tive justice is not a convincing answer—in part for reasons that 
build on insights about promissory obligations—redressive justice 
is a very good fit. The question, then, is when a right holder should 
be able to undo the wrong she has suffered. In the case of contracts, 
the wrong is a contractual breach, and the response to that wrong 
tracks important features of promissory morality. Taking this kind 
of justice seriously, moreover, will often have a beneficial side ef-
fect: it will advance virtuous markets. Of course, advancing markets 
may also be an intended outcome. Intended or not, The Dignity of 
Commerce helps us to see why that outcome is so important. 
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